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China’s increasingly important role in the global economy has transformed 
the nature of global competition and reshaped international trade. 
Meanwhile, the European Union has long been the most important 
power in global trade and continues to run a very large trade surplus. We 
address whether China is an increasingly relevant competitor for Europe 
in third markets, and in particular in Latin America. More specifi cally, we 
empirically estimate the elasticity of substitution between European exports 
and Chinese exports to Latin American economies (ie how their exports to 
Latin America respond to the changes in relative exporting prices).
Our results show that the degree of competition between China and the 
EU in Latin America has increased over time. Before 2007, China and the 
EU competed less with each other, partly refl ecting the fact that China 
was mainly exporting low-quality products. However, the elasticity of 
substitution has increased since 2007, refl ecting China’s ascent up the 
value-added chain. We also look at competition between China and the EU 
in the key EU sectors that export to Latin America. We fi nd that China-EU 
competition is fi ercer in electrical machinery and road vehicles. Th is fi nding 
should be a wake-up call to Europe in its quest to remain competitive at the 
global level.
EUROPEAN AND CHINESE 
TRADE COMPETITION IN 
THIRD MARKETS: THE CASE 
OF LATIN AMERICA
1 Introduction 
The emergence of China as a dominant economic power has transformed the nature of global 
competition and reshaped international trade. China’s increased competitiveness has significantly 
influenced developing and developed countries’ exports. China’s growing export quota has created 
concerns in other exporting economies, including in Europe (Autor et al, 2013; Bloom et al, 2016). 
However, the usually overlooked reality is that China is competing with developed countries not only in 
their home markets but also in third markets. China’s increasingly relevant role in global competition 
for third markets is clearly shown by the Belt and Road Initiative, which targets 68 economies. Given 
this, a natural question is to what extent China is competing with developed countries in the 
developing world. 
We focus on the competition between China and Europe in Latin America. This serves as a good case 
study because Europe has long been a major exporter to Latin America, while China has quickly 
increased its market share from 3 percent in 2000 to 18.3 percent in 2016, and has become the 
largest exporter to several Latin American countries.  
A number of studies have analysed the issue. Nowak (2014) reviewed China’s and the European 
Union’s trade and financial relationships with Latin American from 2000 to 2013 and found that, in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Europe’s willingness to strengthen its relationship with Asian 
countries worsened its trade relations with Latin America. Meanwhile, China became a key exporter to 
the Latin American region. Rodrick (2006) and Hausmann et al (2008) showed that Chinese exports 
are skewed towards sophisticated and high-productivity goods, resembling the export structures of 
high-income countries. However, studies using the concept of trade value added, which takes into 
consideration the vertical linkage of modern global production, toned down the competition effect 
(Wang and Wei, 2010; Koopman et al, 2014). In the same vein, Hallak and Schott (2011) showed that 
the underlying quality of Chinese exports and those of high-income economies are different. This point 
of view is shared by Mandelson and Ferrero-Waldner (2006) when analysing the impact of Chinese 
competition on Europe’s exports to emerging markets such as Asia, Africa and Latin America. By 
contrast, Poncet (2015) showed a more encouraging result for Europe, finding that the EU has 
withstood Chinese competitive pressure pretty well despite similarities in their industries. 
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While interesting, few of these papers have formally estimated the elasticity of substitution of exports 
from a country A (in our case China) with those of another country/area (in our case the EU)1. Our 
paper fills a gap by empirically estimating such elasticity of substitution of exports in third markets 
(namely Latin America). In particular, we specify a translog demand function by assuming that Latin 
America can import from a variety of sources, and allow such elasticities of substitution to vary across 
different trading pairs. Beyond the general estimation, we also estimate such elasticities at a sectoral 
level for Chinese and EU key sectors that export to Latin America.  
Our estimation of the export demand function confirms that the competition between China and the EU 
has been evolving over time. While the EU and China appear to have increased their trade 
complementarity before 2007, competition has become fiercer since then. This reflects the fact that 
China’s export content has been moving up the value chain to offer more high-quality products which 
compete with those from the EU. Moreover, the competition between China and the EU is particularly 
strong over some high-value added products, such as electrical machinery. This finding should be a 
wake-up call to Europe to maintain its competitiveness at the global level.  
Two caveats should be noted, though. First, we use gross trade data and not value-added data. While 
Latin America is relatively isolated from the global production chain (with the notable exception of 
Mexico), use of gross trade data could still distort our results somewhat. Second, our methodology 
does not provide an explicit specification for the supply function, but we try to control for changes in 
supply by introducing time dummies as proxies for aggregate supply shock. Finally, we deal with Latin 
America and the European Union as regional blocks. Some results are offered for the largest EU 
countries but not at the same level of detail as for the EU as whole. 
2 Institutional background and some stylised facts 
China and the EU are the world’s two largest trade giants (Figure 1), and competition between them in 
Latin America has become increasingly intensive. Europe is always an important player in Latin 
America, with its market share stable at approximately 14 percent for the past fifteen years. China, 
however, only accounted for 3 percent of Latin American countries’ imports from the world outside 
Latin America in 2000, but this market share grew rapidly to 18.3 percent in 2016 (Figure 2). Moreover, 
both the EU and China enjoy massive trade surpluses with Latin America: China has been running a 
durable trade surplus which reached a record high of $90 billion in 2015 (Figure 3), whereas Europe 
1 In an earlier Bruegel paper (García-Herrero and Xu, 2016), we analysed, using a similar technique, 
the impact on the EU of growing ties between China and Russia.  
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reversed its trade deficit with Latin America after 2012 with the surplus peaking at $16 billion in 2016 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 1: Share of world exports 
Figure 2: Share of Latin American imports from  1998 to 2015 
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Figure 3: Latin America (LatAm) trade relationship with China, in $ billions 
Figure 4: Latin America trade relationship with Europe, in $ billions 
Against this backdrop, one has to ask whether the rise of China has gradually replaced the EU’s exports 
to Latin America. To get a better understanding of China-EU competition in Latin America, we check 
Latin America’s product-level import structure in relation to the EU and China. Figures 5 and 6 reports 
the top 10 Latin American imports from China and the EU in terms of total trade value. This suggests 
that the biggest competition between the two blocs in Latin America is in the categories of general 
machinery, road vehicles and electrical machinery. The latter stands out because it is the second 
largest exporting sector from the EU to Latin America, and the fifth largest from China to Latin America. 
In addition, the two blocs compete in the provision of road vehicles, which is the third largest exporting 
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products such as textile yarn and clothing, while the EU has a leading position in medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products, power generating machinery and petroleum and chemical products. 
Figure 5: Top Latin American imports from Europe, $ billions, 2014 
Figure 6: Top Latin American imports from China, $ billions, 2014 
Among the Latin American countries, Brazil, Mexico and Chile are China’s three largest trading partners. 
In 2016, China had trade deficits of around $24 billion and $6 billion with Brazil and Chile respectively, 
mainly because of China’s major imports of oil seeds and oleaginous fruits from Brazil and copper from 
Chile. However, China has a significant trade surplus of up to $22 billion with Mexico because of 
China’s exports of electrical machinery. The EU also exports massively to the three largest Latin 
American countries and has a surplus with Mexico because of the EU’s comparative advantage in 
exporting vehicles. EU trade with Brazil and Chile is approximately balanced, with exports and imports 
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reaching $34 billion for the two countries together. Figures 7 and 8 report the country-by-country 
breakdown of Chinese and EU trade with Latin America. 
Figure 7: China's exports to/imports from Latin America ($ millions, 2016) 
 
Figure 8: EU exports to/imports from Latin America ($ millions, 2016) 
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Table 1: EU and Chinese free trade agreements with Latin America 
 Partner country 
Date of entry 
into force End of implementation period Type 
China 
Costa Rica 8/2011 2025 
FTA & Economic Integration 
Agreement 
Chile 8/2010 2015, and updated in 2017 
FTA & Economic Integration 
Agreement 
Peru 3/2010 2026 
FTA & Economic Integration 
Agreement 
EU 
Mexico 4/2018 To be implemented EU-Mexico Global Agreement 
Central America 8/2013 2027 
FTA & Economic Integration 
Agreement 
Peru, Colombia, 
Ecuador 3/2013 2030 
FTA & Economic Integration 
Agreement 
Chile 3/2005 
2013, under negotiation for 
update 
FTA & Economic Integration 
Agreement 
Source: Bruegel. 
As a first attempt to quantitatively assess how close the EU and China’s exports into Latin America are 
in terms of sector distribution, we computed a coefficient index (CI), as the arithmetic average of two 
common measures in the trade literature, namely, the coefficient of specialisation (CS) and the 
coefficient of conformity (CC) 2 (Blazquez-Lidoy et al, 2006). Figure 9 and Table 2 present the 
evolution of the index in the Latin American markets from 1995 to 2016. The calculation shows that 
the CI between China and Europe has increased from 0.33 to 0.46, suggesting sufficient room for China 
and Europe to compete with each other, but the CI has stagnated since beginning of the 2010s. 
Country-by-country analysis further indicates that Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden have expanded 
their product coverage to compete with China in Latin America, while Portugal, France and the United 
Kingdom are exhibiting significantly lower degrees of product coverage than China in the Latin 
American market. 
  
2 These coefficients measures the degree to which a local economic system specialises in one or more economic sectors 
compared to another region. 
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Figure 9: China trade competition indicators, comparison between 1998 and 2016 
Table 2: Coefficient index (CI) 
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and their parts to Latin American countries, but those from Europe should have, in general, a higher 
quality standard than those from China. Thus, even if Chinese firms are expanding their markets in 
Latin America, they might target different consumers to those targeted by the EU, and the competition 
might not be as strong as it appears to be. To tackle this issue, we need to take into account the impact 
of price adjustments to get a more accurate measure of elasticity of substitution. This requires a more 
rigorous econometric analysis. 
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3 An empirical approach to export competition in third markets 
To assess the degree of competition/complementarity between EU and Chinese exports to a third 
market (Latin America in our case), we measure the degree of substitutability of Chinese and EU 
products in response to price variations. We use the CEPII-BACI bilateral trade database to estimate the 
Hicks-Allen elasticities of substitution from a translog cost function, namely: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 +�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 12��𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Where Y is the total imports of Latin America, and Xi and Xj are imports from country i and country j 
respectively. By applying the Shephard’s lemma, we arrive at the following function: 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Where si is the market share of a country in the destination market. The price elasticity is thus defined 
as the follows: 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  for all 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 
Under the assumption of a time-variant aggregate supply function, the above equation closes to an 
equilibrium with an addition of time dummies, which absorb potential time-variant aggregate supply 
shocks. To further take into consideration the case of industry-specific supply shocks, we also conduct 
an industry level econometric exercise in our empirical analysis. 
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4 Aggregate and sectoral results 
The estimated Hicks-Allen elasticity of substitution allows us to take into account the price sensitivity 
across countries of demand adjustment in the third market. Table 3 presents our estimated results.  
Table 3: Estimated results 
Elasticity of substitution in the 
Latin America market 
Europe – China Europe – Rest of World China – Rest of World 
1998-2014 1.24** 1.01** 0.96** 
Source: Bruegel. Note: ** p < 0.05 
The significantly positive estimates show that China, the EU and the rest of world are competing in 
terms of their exports to Latin America. This is a more rigorous justification of the earlier stylised facts 
that China and the EU offer similar categories of products in the Latin American market, ie electrical 
machinery, general machinery and road vehicles. Moreover, the fact that the elasticity is greater than 
one implies that a decrease in the relative price of Chinese goods relative to European goods will 
induce an even larger response in the relative demand adjustment. In other words, China can benefit, 
in terms of larger export revenues in Latin America, from a reduction in its relative export prices. 
In addition, the absolute level of the elasticity of substitution between China and the EU is greater than 
their own elasticity of substitution with the rest of the world. This implies that the two blocs are more 
intensely competing with each other than with other regions in the world. Therefore, an immediate 
conclusion of our estimation is that China and the EU are competing with their exports on the Latin 
American markets. 
One could wonder, though, whether such export competition has become increasingly acute in recent 
years as China has moved up the ladder in terms of its exports structure. This is an a-priori hypothesis 
we gather from the preliminary results obtained by the evolution of the coefficients of specialisation 
for key European countries with China (section II). To more precisely test the hypothesis, we made 
eight-year rolling average estimations of the elasticity of substitution between the EU’s and China’s 
exports to Latin America. Figure 10 reports the results. We found that, although Chinese exports 
increased dramatically before 2007, the degree of China-EU competition actually decreased during the 
same period up to 2007. The results are in line with the idea that Chinese exports were of lower quality 
on average than the EU’s exports, after China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
However, the trend has since been reversed with the elasticity of substitution rapidly picking up after 
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2007. Since then, the earlier situation has changed substantially as Chinese exports have expanded to 
higher-value-added sectors. 
Figure 10: Evolution of the average elasticity of substitution between Europe and China in the Latin 
American market 
 
 
A further breakdown to selected countries shows that China’s most obvious competitor in 2005 was 
Spain, as its elasticities of substitution relative to Chinese exports were the greatest (Figure 11). 
Today, it is actually the UK and France that are China’s most obvious competitors in Latin America. The 
changing pattern seem to be in line with the two countries’ corresponding shifts in market share: the 
UK’s share of Latin America’s imports fell sharply (31 percent from 2012 to 2016) compared to Spain 
(only reduced by 16 percent during the same period). 
Figure 11: Average elasticity over time between China and selected EU countries 
 
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
-0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
Europe* Germany France Spain UK
* Europe excluding France, Germany, Spain and United Kingdom 
12
Moving now to potential differences across products, we estimated sector-level elasticities for EU and 
Chinese exports to Latin America. To that end, we follow the SITC Revision 4 classification, from which 
the 10 largest sectors per country are shown in Figures 5 and 6. The estimated elasticities allow us to 
rank all sectors in two groups: the 10 most complementary sectors (ie with the lowest elasticities) and 
the 10 sectors where the degree of competition is greatest. Both categories are reported separately in 
Figures 12 and 13. The results show that the EU’s high-value-added sectors, such as electric 
machinery and office machinery, face fierce competition from Chinese exports. This is in line with 
China moving up the ladder in its export structure. Our results are also in line with those of Hausmann 
et al (2007), who found that China’s export bundle is increasingly overlapping with that of the world’s 
most-developed economies. 
However, only a few of these highly substitutable products are exported simultaneously with large 
enough market shares by the EU and China to Latin America. Among the most-exported (top 10) 
products from Europe to Latin America, only road vehicles and electrical machinery have a high 
elasticity of substitution with similar Chinese exports. The two sectors thus have systemic relevance 
for the future of EU exports to Latin America. As such, a warning flag could be put up signalling an 
increasingly difficult competitive environment for EU exports at the higher end of the spectrum. More 
specifically, if China continues to move up the ladder, as envisaged in China Manufacturing 2025 (EU 
Chamber of Commerce in China, 2017), the EU might find it harder to compete with China in third 
markets, even in capital-intensive sectors, as is already the case for electric machinery and road 
vehicles, at least in Latin America. 
Figure 12: China-Europe higher elasticities in Latin America across sectors 
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Figure 13: China-Europe lower elasticities in Latin America across sectors 
5 Conclusions 
To assess the competition between China and the EU in Latin American markets, we empirically 
estimated the elasticity of substitution between Europe and China in the Latin American market, ie how 
their exports to Latin America respond to the changes in relative exporting prices. Our results show that 
the degree of competition between China and the EU in Latin America appears to change over time. 
Before 2007, China and the EU competed less with each other, partly reflecting the fact that China was 
mainly exporting low-quality products, whereas the EU aimed at a higher-end market. However, with 
China gradually climbing up the value-added chain, it has also started to produce more high-quality 
products, thereby leading to a higher elasticity of substitution relative to the EU. In fact, the 
competition between China and the EU has been fiercer in some high-end products, especially 
electrical machinery and road vehicles. This finding should be a wake-up call to Europe in its quest to 
remain competitive at the global level. 
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